



DISTINCTIVE IDENTITY CLAIMS, ARTICLE 4(2) TEU 
(AND A FLEETINGLY SAD NOD TO BREXIT)
Of all the academic journal articles that I have read in 2016 none 
has pushed me to think harder about EU law than one which does not 
mention EU law at all. It is ‘Distinctive Identity Claims in Federal Sys-
tems: Judicial Policing of Subnational Variance’ by Antoni Abat i Ninet 
and James A. Gardner.1 The title, focusing on ‘distinctive identity claims, 
captures vividly what the article’s main concern is (which is not always 
the case). Subnational units possess a range of techniques and strategies 
for asserting their claim to distinctive treatment within the wider federal 
arrangement. There must, however, be limits to their latitude to go their 
own way – without such limits, the foundations of the federal system will 
crumble. The article examines a group of rulings by national constitu-
tional courts which involve refusal to grant distinctive treatment on the 
terms claimed by a subnational unit. These rulings, the authors claim, 
reveal judicial anxiety to protect the state against attempts to subvert its 
(national) authority, even if, as they show, the legislature and/or the ex-
ecutive of the State concerned might be noticeably more accommodating 
to the claims advanced. 
Their case studies are five: France / Corsica, Spain / Catalonia, Italy 
/ Sardinia, USA / Texas, and Canada / Quebec. In France, the Conseil 
constitutionel in 1991 invalidated a French law expressing the distinctive 
cultural identity of Corsica on the basis that it represented a threat to 
national unity; in Spain, the Constitutional Court in 2010 found subtle 
ways to suppress radical claims to distinctive treatment expressed in a 
Catalonian Statute of Autonomy; a similar fate met a Sardinian Statute 
of Autonomy in 2007 when it was tested before the Italian Constitutional 
Court; in 1868, shortly after the end of the Civil War, the US Supreme 
Court rejected a claim that Texas could choose to secede from the Union 
by asserting its distinctive southern identity; much more recently the Su-
preme Court of Canada ruled against the existence of a unilateral right to 
secede from the Canadian federation enjoyed by the province of Quebec. 
The problem is, broadly, how to address a claim to promote local 
preferences ahead of the integrity of the wider political unit. The problem 
in EU law is the same. The answers are different. Of course they are dif-
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ferent. The EU is not a State. Its judicial and legislative authorities do 
not and cannot command the same level of obedience that the central 
authorities in a State can and do. This is the point. It is most of all Article 
4(2) TEU that gives room for expression of the EU’s unique mission in 
the light of the types of ‘distinctive identity claims’ which are from time to 
time made by or in its Member States.
Article 4(2) TEU directs that ‘The Union shall respect the equality 
of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, 
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, in-
clusive of regional and local self-government ...’. It is a ‘beefed up’ version 
of a provision that, prior to the reforms effected by the Treaty of Lisbon in 
2009, read more softly that ‘The Union shall respect the national identi-
ties of its Member States’. This was Article 6(3) TEU.
The Court’s case law in which Article 4(2) TEU has been invoked is 
intriguing.  As a general observation, Article 4(2) asserts that as a mat-
ter of EU law certain values recognised and protected under national 
law shall be defended from intrusion by the homogenising and centralis-
ing potential of the EU. Article 4(2) TEU stands not simply as a means 
to protect diversity among the Member States in so far as the Member 
States should aspire to such diversity: it promotes pluralism as an EU 
value. It seeks to mediate the claims to authority of the EU and those of 
the Member States in a situation in which, unlike in France or in Spain 
or in Canada, there really is no single authoritative location of national 
political power that demands to be defended. The Court of Justice has to 
perform a structurally similar job to that pressed on its national coun-
terparts when they are asked to adjudicate ‘distinctive identity claims’ in 
the context of ‘subnational variance’, to use the terms favoured by Antoni 
Abat i Ninet and James A Gardner, but in the EU the context is different 
and more sensitive, because the variance is usually national, not subna-
tional, and the centralised adjudicating institutions are transnational in 
character, not national.
Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien offers a 
splendidly vivid example.2 The litigation which provoked the preliminary 
reference in the case was generated by a difference dating as far back 
as 1919 between Austria, which forbids use of noble titles, and Germa-
ny, which has eliminated associated privileges but still permits parts of 
the noble title to be retained in a person’s surname.  The applicant was 
known in Germany as Ilonka Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein. She was 
advised that in Austria her name had to be slimmed down to Ilonka Sayn-
Wittgenstein. This, the Court agreed, amounted to a serious inconven-
ience to her commercial activity: which, nobly enough, was the sale of 
2 Case C-208/09 [2010] ECR I-13693.
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castles. So, in line with orthodox EU law, the question was whether the 
Austrian restriction on Ilonka’s freedom could be considered justified. 
The Court was openly receptive to the virtue of the Austrian concern, 
reflected in its legal system, to abolish noble titles in the service of equal-
ity of citizens before the law, but it chose to convert this ambition into 
an EU concern. The Court was anxious to permit national authorities a 
‘margin of discretion’.3 It referred to Article 20 of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights, which concerns equality, and it added that in accordance 
with Article 4(2) TEU the Union is to respect the national identities of its 
Member States and that it did not appear disproportionate for a Mem-
ber State to seek to attain the objective of protecting equal treatment 
by prohibiting use of titles of nobility.4 It was on similar terrain more 
recently when it decided Nabiel Peter Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff. 5 The 
applicant was a British/German dual national working as an insolvency 
advisor in London. His full name, duly registered in the UK, was Peter 
Mark Emanuel Graf von Wolffersdorff Freiherr von Bogendorff, although 
he was originally known as Nabiel Bagadi. The German authorities re-
fused to register the name he chose to use in the UK as a result of the 
(certainly rather complex) German laws limiting the use of noble titles. It 
was Graf (Earl) and Freiherr (Baron) to which the authorities in Germany 
objected. A preliminary reference was made to Luxembourg. The Court 
of Justice, interpreting Articles 18 and 21 TFEU, found that the refusal 
constituted a serious inconvenience to the applicant and so it counted as 
a ‘restriction’ within the meaning of EU law. The only justification that is 
addressed with any degree of seriousness by the Court is that concerned 
with suppressing use of noble titles in the cause of equality. Variation 
between Member States and room for discretion is admitted by the Court. 
Advocate General Wathelet had, however, expressed a clear view that the 
rules should be treated as unjustified, but the Court chose to be much 
softer in its treatment of the German practices. The judgment conveys a 
sense that the German practices could be regarded as disproportionate,6 
but, ‘unlike’ in Sayn-Wittgenstein,7 the Court was content to leave the 
assessment to the referring national court. It added explicitly that in ac-
cordance with Article 4(2) TEU ‘the European Union is to respect the 
national identities of its Member States, which include the status of the 
State as a Republic’.8
3 Para 87.
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Article 4(2) TEU is a highly significant statement of respect for the 
national identities of the Member States as a value recognised by and 
embedded in the law of the European Union. It would, however, be an 
error to suppose that Article 4(2) TEU was radically transformative. Even 
before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 one could find 
examples of how EU economic freedoms might clash with national-level 
protection of social and political rights, and, even without the concrete 
direction provided by Article 4(2) TEU, the Court was certainly not imper-
vious to the proper place of such concerns in the development of the law. 
Omega Spielhallen provides the best illustration.9 The dispute at stake 
in Omega Spielhallen involved a ban on ‘Laserdrome’, which is a game 
involving simulated killing. The intervention, driven by the Bonn police 
authority, was motivated by protection of human dignity, a value that is 
constitutionally protected in Germany. This was a restriction on the free 
movement of services (originating in the United Kingdom). The Court had 
‘no doubt that the objective of protecting human dignity’ was compatible 
with EU law and added that it was ‘immaterial in that respect that, in 
Germany, the principle of respect for human dignity has a particular sta-
tus as an independent fundamental right’.10 So, on this approach, what 
was at stake was not EU free movement law versus German protection of 
human dignity, but instead EU free movement law versus EU protection 
of human dignity. That is, EU law itself respected the concerns motivat-
ing the action taken by the Bonn police authority. Today the Court could 
readily confirm this approach by citing Article 1 of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights, which declares human dignity ‘inviolable’, and it could 
also rely on Article 4(2) TEU to explain the importance of the EU as a site 
of respect for national identity claims. But the point is that even well in 
advance of these innovations of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court in Omega 
found a way to ensure that German anxieties about the damaging effect 
of trade integration on fundamental rights were accommodated as EU 
anxieties that were apt to mitigate the deregulatory cutting edge of free 
movement law. So Article 4(2) TEU captures the idea that national con-
stitutional sensitivities form a proper part of the assessment of whether 
trade-restrictive practices are justified – but not because they are nation-
al constitutional sensitivities, but rather because they are constitutional 
sensitivities. They are absorbed at EU level – and even before the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 they were so absorbed.
This is the EU version of protection of ‘distinctive identity claims’. 
Sometimes those claims are advanced as national in character, as in 
Sayn-Wittgenstein and in Nabiel Peter Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff. But 
Article 4(2) TEU is not so limited. In Omega Spielhallen it was the Bonn 
9 Case C-36/02 [2004] ECR I-9609.
10 Para 34.
XI
police authority’s interpretation of the German constitutional value of 
human dignity on which the ruling rested, and in Bonn they were a great 
deal more fastidious about such matters when compared with most of the 
rest of Germany where ‘Laserdrome’ was freely available, but the Court 
did not at all suggest that the relatively localised sensitivity involved 
should deprive the public authority of its ability to advance a ‘distinctive 
identity claim’ recognised by EU law. In fact, national identity may itself – 
as a national value – be sub-divisible. In Digibet, the Court, citing Article 
4(2) TEU, agreed that Germany could defend restrictions on gambling as 
consistent and coherent, even where the Länder in fact apply different 
rules within Germany across a rather wide spectrum of tolerance.11
Article 4(2) TEU acts as a gateway through which national and sub-
national concerns pass and are transformed into specifically EU con-
cerns. It does not of itself provide answers to questions about competing 
values – it provides a framework within which to seek those answers. It is 
a way to mediate claims of EU law which tend towards homogeneity and 
centralisation and claims of national identity that tug towards fragmen-
tation – and to nudge in the direction of a managed resolution that yields 
pluralism and mutual respect. In this way, EU law itself accommodates 
space to advance distinctive identity claims. But this cannot and should 
not mean an automatic subjection to a State’s appeal to its constitutional 
values in circumstances where that State’s practices obstruct inter-State 
trade. Such a radically softened test of justification would fatally un-
dermine the aim of constructing an internal market and, deeper still, it 
would threaten the EU’s own values. Put another way, there must be a 
limit to the successful invocation of a distinctive identity claim in the EU. 
A quality check on what defence of national identity entails is required. 
This is best achieved by linking Article 4(2) TEU, as an EU – not a uni-
laterally national – understanding of national identity to the EU’s own 
values expressed in Articles 2 and 3 TEU. So, as Siniša Rodin has put it 
in the pages of this Yearbook, a State must not be allowed to rely on Arti-
cle 4(2) TEU as a basis to protect national identity in circumstances that 
would in substance contradict the EU’s own values.12 The Court needs to 
be attentive in weeding out the transformation of feeble economic and so-
cial justifications into claimed protection of national identity, while also, 
as in Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein, taking seriously more validly shaped 
distinctive identity claims. This is the limit but also the dynamic potential 
that is contributed to EU law by Article 4(2) TEU. 
11 Case C-156/13 Digibet, judgment of 12 June 2014.
12 S Rodin, ‘National Identity and Market Freedoms after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2011) 7 
CYELP 11.
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So, in sum, the EU – and not only its Court, but also its politi-
cal institutions and its Member States too – should not be too reticent 
about asserting EU values when faced by ‘distinctive identity claims’. I 
hesitate to mention Brexit, but now I do so. There are many milestones 
on the road that led to the vote to leave the EU on 23 June 2016, but 
two in particular stand out as demonstrations of what can go horribly 
wrong when a State asserts its own exceptionalism and demeans the 
EU. One is immigration. One of the ways David Cameron made his politi-
cal career was as a critic of the level of migration to the UK by nationals 
of other EU Member States. In particular, he periodically claimed that 
the UK’s generous welfare benefit system acted as a ‘pull’. Not only was 
there no evidence for this, in fact the evidence base tended in precisely 
the opposite direction: migrants from other Member States pay more tax 
than they take in benefits and moreover the pressure they exert on the 
benefit system is proportionately less heavy than that exerted by British 
nationals. Yet still Cameron demanded a ‘solution’ to this non-problem: 
and as part of the ill-fated renegotiation concluded in February 2016 
at a meeting of the European Council he got it.13 The agreed (and now 
extinct) deal included a cautiously written section on access of migrants 
to social benefits, including a commitment to initiate a process leading 
to revision of particular pieces of secondary legislation. It was, in short, 
a ‘benefit brake’.14 Cameron should not have been surprised that this 
febrile equation of immigration with threat rather than opportunity led 
to many voters taking the easy route of choosing not to remain in the EU 
under conditions of cosmetically restricted migration but instead to leave 
the EU and – in the rhetoric of the referendum campaign – to ‘take back 
control’ over immigration completely. Cameron had aggressively present-
ed the EU as a threat to national identity: what he should have done, in 
line with the above-mentioned reading of Article 4(2) TEU, is to present 
the national interest within the wider context of the EU’s values and its 
economic framework. So too in the case of the second ghastly mis-step 
that paved the way for Brexit: the question of the scope of EU activity. It 
has been common for decades for politicians of Cameron’s party (in par-
ticular) to criticise the EU for over-reach. In 2012, under the title Review 
of the Balance of Competences, the UK government announced an objec-
tive and in-depth investigation into whether the balance of competences 
between State and EU level is appropriate. A series of 32 documents cov-
ering a wide range of sectors was prepared and published by the British 
government in 2013 and 2014.15 The conclusion was clear: the balance 
13 ‘A New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union’ OJ 2016 CI 69/1. 
14 See C O’Brien, ‘Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New Guiding Principle of EU Free 
Movement Rights’ (2016) 53 CML Rev 937, 966-973.
15 The British Government, ‘Review of the Balance of Competences’ <https://www.gov.uk/
review-of-the-balance-of-competences> accessed 30 October 2016.
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of competences between the UK and the EU was broadly correct. Surely, 
one would think, this detailed myth-slaying would play a serious role in 
the campaign: for sure it would have done so had the findings been the 
opposite. Not so. Cameron ignored it. So (therefore) did the print and 
broadcast media. As a critical report published in March 2015 by the EU 
Committee of the House of Lords noted with unconcealed exasperation, 
the government had failed actively to publicise the findings of the Review 
of the Balance of Competences.16 Ministers had repeatedly informed the 
Committee ‘that the purpose of the Review is to ground the public debate 
on the EU on a strong evidence base’, but, as the House of Lords report 
drily notes, this is ‘an unrealistic aim, as long as the public are unaware 
of the Review’s existence’. 17 Cameron was more concerned to avoid dis-
turbing the comfortable narrative of the over-mighty EU than to engage 
with any defence of its virtues. And so the referendum was lost (and with 
it Cameron’s political career18). What was needed was to present the EU 
as (doubtless imperfect) success, not threat, but the chance was missed 
– the chance was deliberately avoided. For the UK the chance is now 
probably gone. Of course the UK did not vote to leave the EU because of a 
mishandling of Article 4(2) TEU, but the debate was corroded by a failure 
not only to promote national aspiration but also to locate its realisation 
within a wider transnational context of managed interdependence among 
European States. That is the spirit of Article 4(2) TEU. Other Member 
States and the EU institutions should take note. ‘Distinctive identity 
claims’ have their place in the EU, as they do in any system of power di-
vided between different levels in the polity. But the virtues of the whole, 
and not only of the parts, need advertising and defending too. The EU’s 
means of doing so are more brittle than those of France, Spain, Italy, 
the United States or Canada. I concluded a book written and published 
shortly before the Brexit earthquake with a gloomy fear that citizens will 
come to see the EU as the cause of their problems, not a means to solve 
them, and that this ‘will tilt the momentum back to the apparently safe 
haven, and certainly better recognised site, of national level politics – and 
nationalism – but it will not make solving the problems any easier’. In-
stead it ‘will make blaming and causing harm to other Europeans easier 
… a road too often travelled by Europeans through history’. 19 That was 
(and is) the spirit of Brexit. Be careful. The EU is precious, but it is fragile.
16 HL Paper 140, 12th Report of Session 2014-2015.
17 Page 18.
18 He resigned as Prime Minister and by autumn 2016 he was no longer even a Member of 
Parliament, having resigned his seat. 
19 S Weatherill, Law and Values in the European Union (OUP, Clarendon Law Series 2016) 
419.
